

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 184080

51

ORIGIN EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-11 IO-14 L-03

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L/EUR;MR. RUSSELL(INFORMED)

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN

INFO USMISSION BERLIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 184080

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, WB, US, GW

SUBJECT: FRG APPROACH ON EXTENSION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION TO BERLIN

REF: A) BONN 12191; B) BONN 17366; C) STATE 244058

1. DEPARTMENT HAS CONSIDERED WHETHER TO REOPEN QUESTION
OF EXTENDING TO BERLIN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, AND
FINDS NO PERSUASIVE BASIS FOR CHANGING EARLIER POSITION
TAKEN IN BONN GROUP (REFTEL B). DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDS
THAT EMBASSY REPLY TO FRG AIDE MEMOIRE INCORPORATE POINTS
MADE REF B, MAKING CLEAR AT TIME OF PRESENTATION OUR
RELUCTANCE TO REOPEN ISSUE.

2. RE PARA 3 REFTTEL A, WE FULLY AGREE THAT VAN WELL'S
SUGGESTION FOR PERCENTAGE TYPE SYSTEM TO DETERMINE WHETHER
OR NOT ANY TREATY TO BE EXTENDED TO BERLIN FALLS INTO
SECURITY AND STATUS CATEGORY IS NONSTARTER. BEYOND OBVIOUS
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PAGE 02 STATE 184080

DIFFICULTY IN MAKING SUCH DETERMINATION IN EACH CASE, WE

BELIEVE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ALLIES MAINTAIN THEIR FLEXIBILITY IN REVIEWING EACH TREATY EXTENSION ON ITS MERITS IN LIGHT OF PREVAILING POLITICAL AND LEGAL SITUATION. IN THIS REGARD, WE SEE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EXTENSION OF NPT AND SEABEDS TREATIES TO BERLIN AND EXTENSION BACTERIOLOGICAL AND TOXIC WEAPONS CONVENTION. NPT EXTENSION WITH SAFEGUARDS FEATURE, LAID BASIS FOR ANY FUTURE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT IN CITY, AND SEABEDS TREATY DID NOT AFFECT BERLIN AS INLAND CITY IN ANY PRACTICAL WAY. SITUATION IS DISSIMILAR HOWEVER FOR B/W TREATY WHICH DEALS MAINLY WITH WEAPONS PRODUCTION, AND CAN THEREFORE BE REASONABLY VIEWED AS DEFENSE-RELATED TREATY CONCERNED EXCLUSIVELY WITH SECURITY I.E. INAPPROPRIATE FOR EXTENSION TO BERLIN. KISSINGER

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